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Abstract
The study analyzes students’ conceptions of the 
representational nature attributed to images in 
biology. The conceptions regarding the relation-
ship between representation and referent can 
be categorized into realism and constructivism. 
171 students aged 12, 14, and 16 participated in 
the study. Some had had specific instruction in 
biology and some had not.  Several instruments, 
such as Likert scale questionnaires, and multiple 
choice and open-ended questions were used to 
measure the conceptions. Students show realistic 
conception about the nature of a cell micropho-
tography. The primacy of perceptive aspects in 
visual representations may explain these results, 
the difficulties students have in learning them, 
and the need of their explicit instruction.
Keywords: students’ conceptions, learning, vi-
sual representation, representational nature of 
images, biology, learning difficulties.
Resumen
Este estudio tuvo como objetivo analizar las con-
cepciones de los estudiantes sobre la naturaleza 
representacional de las imágenes en biología. 
Las concepciones sobre la relación entre la re-
presentación y el referente pueden categorizarse 
como realista o constructivista. Para tal fin, 171 
estudiantes de 12 a 16 años, con y sin instrucción 
específica en biología, respondieron cuestiona-
rios de escala Likert, con preguntas abiertas y 
de opción múltiple. En general, los estudiantes 
mostraron una concepción realista sobre la ima-
gen de una célula. La primacía de los aspectos 
perceptivos de las imágenes puede explicar estos 
resultados, así como las dificultades que tienen 
los estudiantes en su aprendizaje y la necesidad 
de su instrucción explícita. 
Palabras clave: concepciones de estudiantes, 
aprendizaje, representaciones visuales, natura-
leza representacional de las imágenes, biología, 
dificultades en el aprendizaje.
Resumo
Este estudo teve como objetivo analisar as conce-
pções dos estudantes sobre a natureza represen-
tacional das imagens em biologia. As concepções 
sobre a relação entre a representação e o referen-
te podem categorizar-se como realistas ou cons-
trutivas. Para isso, 171 estudantes de 12 a 16 anos, 
com e sem instrução específica em biologia, 
responderam a questionários de escala Likert, 
com perguntas abertas e de múltipla escolha. Em 
geral, os estudantes mostraram uma concepção 
realista sobre a imagem de uma célula. A prima-
zia dos aspectos perceptivos das imagens pode 
explicar esses resultados, assim como as dificul-
dades que os estudantes têm em sua aprendiza-
gem e na necessidade de sua instrução explícita. 
Palavras-chave: concepções de estudantes, 
aprendizagem, representações visuais, natureza 
representacional das imagens, biologia, dificul-
dades na aprendizagem.
*  Este estudio forma parte del proyecto de investigación EDU2010-21995-C02-01, financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación del gobierno 
español y dirigido por J. I. Pozo.266
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Science conveys its knowledge not 
only through words but also through images 
(Lemke, 1990; Lynch, & Woolgar, 1990; Mathew-
son, 1999). This type of representation systems 
holds an increasingly important place not only 
in science but in current society (Andersen, 
Scheuer, Pérez-Echeverría, & Teubal, 2009). Ex-
amples of these systems are diagrams, illustra-
tions, photographs, maps, graphs, models, and 
tables. All of these are characterised by a visual 
and a spatial nature, since they are marks carried 
out in space. These visual-spatial systems1 are 
forms of representing, handling, communicat-
ing, learning, solving problems, and reconsider-
ing scientific knowledge. 
One way to discriminate among images is to 
consider the degree of similarity or analogy be-
tween the image and the represented object (Martí, 
2003; Pérez-Echeverría, Postigo, López-Manjón, 
& Marín, 2009; Shah, Freedman, & Veriki, 2005). 
Thus, we can establish an analogic-arbitrary con-
tinuum in which to situate the different types of 
images. At one end of the continuum would be the 
group of “iconic” or “figurative” representations, 
such as photographs, illustrations and drawings, 
which reproduce the spatial characteristics of the 
referent with a high similarity.  At the other end 
of the continuum would be the group of abstract 
representations such as graphs, tables, maps, and 
diagrams, which, due to their abstract nature, 
show less fidelity between the image and the refer-
ent and a more selective or schematic correspon-
dence between both elements. Nevertheless, all of 
them share the feature of enabling an integrated 
and simple representation of large amounts of in-
formation and knowledge that are interrelated in 
a complex manner (Barquero, Schnotz, & Reuter, 
2000) or information difficult to report by words 
(Roth, Pozzer-Ardenghi, & Han, 2005).
1  Although our use of terms such as image, visual, gra-
phical or figurative representations is interchangeable, 
the term visual-spatial representation seems to us the 
most appropriate because, as we have just pointed out, it 
covers an essential part of these representations such as 
their spatial nature.
Our argument is that if visual-spatial sys-
tems are fundamental in science, they should be 
taken into account for the successful learning of 
science (Mathewson, 1999). Of all the different 
aspects of visual-spatial systems, we are inter-
ested in their representational nature, that is, the 
relationship established between the representa-
tional setting (an image or visual-spatial repre-
sentation) and what is represented (its referent). 
Various studies reveal that, in spite of the diffi-
culty of the dual nature of these systems (they 
are simultaneously objects and symbolic repre-
sentations), the capability to make a distinction 
between the representation and that represented 
occurs very early on (DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, 
Uttal, Rosengren, & Gottlieb, 1998; Perner, 1991). 
However, the difficulty is not simply to discrimi-
nate between both elements but to think about 
them, that is, to understand and to be aware of the 
complex relationship between the two elements, 
which is the aim of this study. From our perspec-
tive, this aspect has an influence on teaching and 
learning about scientific images and, therefore, 
on the acquisition of scientific knowledge. 
There are two ways of conceiving the rela-
tionship between the representation and the ref-
erent based on the epistemological relationship 
between knowledge and reality (Pozo & Gómez, 
1998; Vosniadou, 1994). 
A so-called realistic conception  is based 
on the principle of correspondence according 
to which our representations would be a copy 
of reality; learning would be making copies of 
the object; and teaching would be clearly show-
ing the object (Pozo, Scheuer, Pérez-Echeverría, 
Mateos, Martín, & De la Cruz 2006). In the case 
of visual-spatial representations or images, the 
iconic nature and, therefore, the relationship 
of similarity between representation and that 
represented would account for the attribution 
of a realistic nature compared to other systems 
of representation such as writing or numeri-
cal annotation whose relationship is arbitrary. 
This fact makes visual representation especially 267
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“transparent” (Lowe, 1993, p. 24) and, therefore, 
specific teaching or instruction to be able to in-
terpret and understand it is unnecessary (Reid, 
1990). It is assumed that processes of translation 
or extraction of meaning in the image are not 
necessary, that is, their meaning is obtained au-
tomatically. This conception also seems aimed 
at the treatment given to visual representations 
in  science textbooks at different educational 
levels (Jiménez & Perales, 2001; López-Manjón 
& Postigo, 2008; Postigo & López-Manjón 2012; 
Stylianidou & Ogborn, 2002), where there is lit-
tle help to interpret the textbook images. 
On the other hand, if knowledge is a copy 
or a “reflection” of how things are, knowledge 
can only be “true” or “false” because there is just 
one reality. Translating this idea into visual rep-
resentations, it is only possible to assume the ex-
istence of a single true image of an object, unless 
the existence of different images is accepted, be-
cause they refer to different objects (e.g., differ-
ent images of the cell would be possible because 
there are different kinds of cells). This could be 
called the “naïve realistic” conception. However, 
this conception seems to develop through age 
and instruction toward the so called “interpre-
tative realism”, which implies a more complex 
way of understanding the relationship between 
knowledge and reality (Pozo et al., 2006). Al-
though that knowledge reflects reality and the 
learning goal is to copy reality, it is almost im-
possible to achieve this with exactitude. Accord-
ing to the above conception, the reason why it is 
impossible to achieve an exact copy of reality has 
to do with factors related to the student and to 
the task. The need for students to carry out com-
plex cognitive processing (attention, memory, 
motivation, etc.), together with certain charac-
teristics of students (intelligence, cognitive de-
velopment, previous knowledge), and the need 
of specific practical conditions to learn make it 
very difficult to attain “real or true knowledge” 
(Pozo & Gómez, 1998). The interpretative real-
istic conception accepts the existence of more 
than one type of knowledge, but accepts only 
one as true. Translating this idea into visual rep-
resentations, even when the presence of various 
images to represent an object is accepted, there 
will always be one image which “really” captures 
the object, and so it would be considered the 
true one. The other images will not be true be-
cause of criteria related to technical or editing 
factors which hinder their correct perception.
The second way of understanding the rela-
tionship between representation and the object 
represented would be the so-called constructivist 
conception which  assumes that the representa-
tion (the image in this case) is a construction in 
the sense that it is one of the possible perspec-
tives from which the object can be represented. 
Contrary to the realistic conception, learning 
visual representations would not be a process 
of making copies of reality but rather a process 
of re-construction aimed at interpreting and 
producing such representations (Martí, 2003).
In addition, there would not be a sole true rep-
resentation because there may be many differ-
ent representations referred to the same reality 
and with the same true status (Pozzer-Ardenghi 
& Roth, 2003). An image is a particular way of 
representing reality and may be interpreted dif-
ferently according to several factors: the inter-
nal characteristics inherent to the visual-spatial 
representational system, the background knowl-
edge of the observer, and the aims for which this 
representation is used. Regarding the first factor, 
for example, visual representations in biology 
and especially the representations of anatomi-
cal structures have some specific characteristics: 
(a) they are representations which often have to 
reflect three dimensions; (b) they are structures 
which inevitably contain other internal structures 
and, (c) in order to represent internal anatomic 
structures, it is necessary to use specific structural 
sections (e.g., sagittal, ventral, etc.). According to 
Constable, Campbell, and Brown (1988), students 
have problems interpreting visual representa-
tions in biology because they are unaware of the 268
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conventions used with different types of sections. 
Therefore, students should  have not only a sound 
command of the grammar of systems (their syn-
taxes) and their meaning (their semantics) but 
also of their strategic use with various purposes 
or aims (e.g., with the aim of communicating 
based on who they are aimed at). We assume that 
learning and teaching visual representations is 
a highly complex process as shown by research 
about students’ difficulties (e.g. Díaz & Jiménez, 
1996; Pintó & Ametller, 2002).
From our perspective, one of the great-
est difficulties in learning science is making 
students see that images are representations of 
objects and concepts and not objects in them-
selves. This means moving away from a realistic/
interpretative realistic conception toward a con-
structivist conception (Gómez & Pozo, 2004) of 
visual representations in science. 
Research has been carried out regarding 
epistemological conceptions or beliefs about 
knowledge in general (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 
2002; Schommer, 1990; Schraw, Bendixen, & 
Dunkle, 2002), from a quantitative and psycho-
metric approach, taking an analytical and struc-
tural view of the components and dimensions of 
these beliefs. Also, research on science learning 
has focused on conceptions of scientific knowl-
edge due to their influence in the learning and 
teaching of science (Leach, Millar, Ryder, & Sere, 
2000; Thoermer & Sodian, 2002). However, we 
have not found any studies that analyze these 
conceptions in relation to scientific images. In 
this study, our approach differs from the quanti-
tative and psychometric approach and coincides 
with the science learning approach but focusing 
on the images in science learning. Thus, the aim 
of this exploratory study is to analyze concep-
tions of representational nature (from realism to 
constructivism via interpretative realism) which 
students of different ages (12, 14 and 16 years old) 
and different specific biology instruction attrib-
ute to one kind of image: a cell photomicrograph. 
We expect to find that students show realistic 
conceptions related to visual representations. 
From the approach proposed here, the attribu-
tion of a realistic nature to images by students 
would be accounted for by the important role that 
perception plays in cognition as the hypothesis 
of embodied cognition maintains (Gibbs, 2006;   
Pozo & Gómez, 2005). This realistic nature would 
be one of the restrictions on the basis of which we 
would build our intuitive representations of the 
world as verified in other domains of knowledge 
(e.g. Gómez & Pozo, 2004; Vosniadou, 1994). 
Specifically, we are interested in answering 
the following questions: 
First of all, what conceptions do students 
have about the representational nature of an im-
age? Are they the same as the conceptions about 
scientific knowledge? We think that a complex 
topic like this, mainly due to its implicit nature, 
should be approached using a variety of instru-
ments. Thus, we gave students a questionnaire, 
adapted from Pecharromán and Pozo (2006), in 
which they had to choose, in a Likert scale, among 
different conceptions of a biological image. We 
also compared them with the results of applying 
the same questionnaire (Pecharromán & Pozo, 
2006) about scientific knowledge, to see whether 
the conceptions were the same or not. Finally, we 
analyzed the conceptions using two other tasks: 
multiple choice and open-ended questions. 
Secondly, do these conceptions about the 
nature of an image vary according to age/educa-
tional level, on the one hand, and depending on 
the level of specific biological instruction, on the 
other?  We wanted to transversally research the 
development of these conceptions between the 
ages of 12 and 16. Considering the research in oth-
er contexts (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; 
Mason, 2002; Pérez-Echeverría, Mateos, Pozo, & 
Scheuer, 2001; Pozo & Gómez, 1998) we wanted 
to know whether, in their educational process (in-
extricably linked to age), students advance toward 
more complex image conceptions such as the 
constructivist one. Thus, the realistic conception 
would be found more frequently among groups 269
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of younger students, and interpretative realistic 
conceptions in older students as an intermediate 
stage in the transition from realistic to construc-
tivist conceptions. We also expected to find more 
constructivist conceptions in students with spe-
cific instruction in biology, compared to students 
of the same age and with no specific instruction 
in biology. However, taking into account the re-
sults of the previous studies, we cannot be sure 
that these differences are remarkable. Finally, as 
an exploratory question and as a consequence of 
the supposed realistic attribution, we expected to 
find certain conceptions of learning and teach-
ing about visual representations. Specifically, we 
wanted to see whether image processing and in-
terpretation can be attributed to a certain innate 
capacity (intelligence or visual-spatial capability) 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; Schommer, 1990) or 
not. We also wanted to know whether students 
think that visual representations do not need to 
be taught (Lowe, 2007; Reid, 1990).  The idea was 
to compare these results to those obtained by ap-
plying the scientific knowledge questionnaire also 
used in the Pecharromán and Pozo (2006) study.
Method
Participants
In order to analyze the development of stu-
dents’ conceptions at different ages and the ef-
fect of specific instruction in biology, we selected 
students from several educational levels in sec-
ondary and high school2. We chose secondary 
education because that is when students begin to 
receive instruction in biology as an independent 
subject, instead of the global instruction given 
in primary education. In the case of high school, 
besides the comparison with the secondary level, 
2  The Spanish educational system includes four years of 
mandatory secondary education for students between 
the ages of 12 and 16. There are two years of high school 
(students between the ages of 17 and 18), in which stu-
dents may choose among different modalities with spe-
cific instruction in social sciences and natural sciences, 
among others before going on to the university.
we were interested in the effect of specialized in-
struction in biology on two groups (those with 
and without specialized instruction in biology). 
We performed a cross-sectional study from the 
beginning of secondary education to high school 
also exploring an intermediate level in secondary 
school. We chose the groups taking into account 
a difference of two years of age between them.
The total sample was made up of 171 par-
ticipants divided into four groups. The students 
were all middle-class and attended the same pub-
lic secondary and high school in Madrid (Spain). 
We selected the students from the already formed 
complete regular class groups. The characteris-
tics of the four groups were the following: 
1. 51 students from the first year of compul-
sory secondary education (1ºCSE) (comprised of 
28 male and 23 female students. Mean age: 12.76 
years) (in the Observe this Image task, three 
participants who did not complete the task were 
eliminated; there were 48 students for this task).
2. 49 students from the third year of com-
pulsory secondary education (3ºCSE) (com-
prised of 18 males and 31 females. Mean age: 
14.48 years) (in the Observe this Image task, two 
participants who did not complete the task were 
eliminated; there were 47 students for this task).
3. 32 students from the first year of A lev-
el (social sciences) (1ºA-SS): (comprised of 10 
males and 22 females. Mean age: 16.72 years). 
This group had had specific instruction in social 
science subjects.
4. 39 students from the first year of A level 
(natural sciences) (1ºA-NS): (comprised of 27 
males and 12 females. Mean age: 16.61 years). 
This research was performed at the end of the 
academic year for which reason the group had 
had specific instruction in biology.
instruments
To analyze the characteristics of students’ 
conceptions, we used four instruments: 
1. The Natural Sciences Questionnaire was 
used with the aim of analyzing the characteristics 270
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of students’ conceptions of scientific knowledge 
in the natural sciences, designed by Pecharromán 
and Pozo (2006), and to compare them to the 
conceptions about the image. This questionnaire 
is an adaptation of the instrument designed for 
the classical research group of epistemological 
beliefs (Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002). By 
means of expert validation (psychology and phi-
losophy experts), Pecharromán and Pozo (2006) 
adapted this questionnaire to the natural science 
domain regarding conceptions of the nature of 
knowledge and conceptions of the acquisition 
of knowledge. The questionnaire is comprised 
of 22 items in six scales (objectivism, relativism, 
constructivism, immediate knowledge, restricted 
knowledge, and shared knowledge) with a Likert-
type scale response format; agree-disagree on a 
6-point scale. Although we applied the original 
questionnaire, we were only interested in analyz-
ing the items of some of the scales (see Appendix 
A) grouped together in the following way: 
•	 Realistic scale comprised of items 1, 4, 18, 
and 22 (from the original objectivism and 
immediate knowledge scales). For example, 
“A discovery or proven scientific law is and 
always will be true”.
•	 Constructivist scale comprised of items 3, 
6, and 16 (from the original constructivism 
scale). For example, “The effort of scientists 
may attain an increasingly more approxi-
mate knowledge of what occurs in natu-
re but they will never ever be sure of their 
theories”.
•	 Innate-Learned scale comprised of items 
7, 15, and 17 (from the original restricted 
knowledge and shared knowledge scales). 
For example, “For the most part, scientific 
laws arise from or are discovered in our inner 
selves; we don’t need to be taught these laws”.
We obtained the mean score in each scale 
for each group of participants.
2. The Image Questionnaire was based on 
the above questionnaire (Pecharromán & Pozo, 
2006). The aim was to analyze conceptions of 
a cell image, focusing on relationships between 
the representation and its referent (realistic, con-
structivist) and certain ideas regarding how im-
ages are learned (innate or learned ability). We 
validated this adaptation by a group of experts 
(3 university teachers in epistemology and 3 in 
science learning) who assessed the adequacy of 
each item to the related conception. Subsequent-
ly, we tested the task in several pilot studies with 
173 participants (A level students and university 
students with different levels of instruction in 
biology and a group of secondary biology teach-
ers) (see López-Manjón & Postigo, 2009). As a 
result of these pilot studies, we defined a 17-item 
questionnaire with a 6-point Likert-type scale 
response format to measure the degree of agree-
ment with the different statements (see Appen-
dix A). The questionnaire is comprised of three 
scales which reflect two kinds of conceptions (re-
alistic and constructivist conceptions), and some 
ideas on the nature of capabilities (innate or 
learned) necessary to interpret images. All of the 
questionnaire items refer to the image of a cell 
presented on the first page of the questionnaire.
•	 The Realistic scale is comprised of seven 
items: 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, and 16. For example, 
“Good images of a cell are those which re-
liably and exactly reflect what a cell is”.
•	 The Constructivist scale is comprised of se-
ven items:  2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, and 15. For exam-
ple, “There are no correct and incorrect 
images of a cell as this depends on several 
factors, for example, the purpose for which 
we wish to use it, whom it is aimed at, etc.”
•	 The Innate-Learned scale is comprised of 
three items: 1, 9, and 17 (scores near 6 points 
on the Likert scale mean an innate concep-
tion). For example, “It is sufficient to look at 
a cell’s image to understand it and it is not 
necessary for us to be taught to look at it”.
We obtained the mean score in each scale 
for each group of participants.271
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3. The Agreement Task was designed to 
analyze the representational nature attributed 
to a cell’s image. The first sheet of the task pre-
sented the cell’s image and a situation in which 
three supposed students made certain comments 
corresponding to the three conceptions of the re-
lationship between scientific images as represen-
tation and their referent (realistic, interpretative   
realistic and constructivist conceptions): Student 
1: “This image shows what a cell is really like. This 
is an image in which all the important aspects can 
be identified. This is the only way to show what a 
cell is really like.” (realistic conception). Student 
2: “This image shows one of the possible ways 
of presenting what a cell is really like. However, 
among all those that can be made is quite a good 
and clear image which shows us what it is really 
like” (interpretative realistic conception). Student 
3: “This image shows a specific vision of a cell 
from a certain point of view. It does not present us 
with all the aspects of the cell, but only with those 
they want to highlight for some reason.” (con-
structivist conception). The task required partici-
pants to select the student statement expressing 
the position most closely aligned with their own 
opinions, and to justify their choice.
In the Agreement Task, for each group of 
participants we obtained the percentage of choi-
ce for each one of the conceptions: realism (1), 
interpretative realism (2) and constructivism 
(3). In addition, the participants had to justify 
the choice. The criteria to categorise justifica-
tions were the following: 
0 = No justification: this category includes 
participants who did not respond, those who 
repeated the opinion of the student they had 
chosen, and those who gave tautological justifi-
cations in which no type of information or new 
idea was provided. 
1 = Realistic conception: includes those 
justifications which emphasised the idea that 
the image shows reality, from which it is evi-
dent that it is real because it is a photograph. In 
case of accepting this, there are different ways of 
presenting a cell because there are different ty-
pes of cells and, therefore, different referents. 
2 = Interpretative realistic conception: jus-
tifications in accordance with the idea that there 
are various ways of presenting a cell and that 
these refer to stressing some aspects and not 
others, but without mentioning the reasons for 
which they are stressed. We also resorted to vi-
sual clarity or resolution to explain the presence 
of different ways of presenting them.
3 = Constructivist conception: justifications 
which consider the presence of different view-
points based on criteria such as the importance 
of aspects emphasized, the nature of the ob-
ject (three-dimensional vs. two-dimensional; 
external vs. internal), and the intention of the 
observer. All these criteria are used when con-
sidering the presence of different representa-
tions for a same object.
The justifications of participants were clas-
sified entirely by the two authors, working inde-
pendently and on the basis of the previous four 
categories. A high level of inter-judge agreement 
was attained (Kappa coefficient=0.864; p<.001). 
The discrepant cases were resolved by consensus.
4. Observe this Image. This task involved the 
presentation of the image of a cell, followed by 
five open questions on the relationship between 
representation and its referent. The purpose of 
Question 1 (“What appears in the image?”) was to 
analyze whether participants mentioned only the 
referent or the idea of representation. For Question 
2 they had to state how they believed the image 
was obtained. Question 3 referred to whether they 
believe it is possible to produce different versions 
of the same image. Questions 4 and 5 asked them 
to analyze the characteristics of the production of 
images by two biologists faced with the same ob-
ject (Question 4) and state which one shows the 
object better (Question 5). These two questions 
refer to the possibility of assuming the presence of 
various representations of the same object and in 
this case the criterion to decide which representa-
tion is the best or correct one (see Appendix A).272
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In the task Observe this Image, responses 
were classified according to the criteria collated in 
Table 1 and with the three conceptions of the re-
lationship between scientific images as represen-
tation and their referent. We assigned a score of 0 
when they had not interpreted the question co-
rrectly, they did not answer, or they did not know. 
We assigned the score of 1 for the realistic 
conception, 2 for the interpretative realistic con-
ception, and 3 for the constructivist conception. 
We pointed out that a low number of participants 
(4.2% of the sample) gave responses which could 
be classified simultaneously in more than one 
conception, giving them a mixed score for the 
different conceptions they showed (e.g., realis-
tic and constructivist conception “1+3”). These 
cases were categorized into a mixed conception 
category. We obtained the percentage of each one 
of the conceptions in each group for each of the 
questions. The categorisation of responses given 
by participants was classified entirely by both au-
thors, working independently on the basis of the 
previous five categories. The results of inter-judge 
agreement (Kappa coefficient) attained satisfac-
tory values (varying between 0.664 and 0.834). 
The discrepant cases were resolved by consensus.
Table 1 
Criteria for Analysis of Conceptions of the Relationship between the Representation and its Referent
Conception               Realistic                                        Interpretative realistic                        Constructivist
Question 1
What is it?
The referent                  -- A type of representation
Question 2
How was it  
obtained?
Technical mechanism for obtaining 
the image
                 -- Model or theory which is the 
product of a prior study. 
Question 3
Other versions? 
No other versions can be made. 
Yes, because there are different 
kinds of referents.
Yes, because of aspects such as 
their resolution, colour, clarity, 
brightness, larger or smaller size, or 
a fuller, more detailed image …
Yes, highlighting alternative ways 
of representing the image. 
Question 4
Productions of 2 
biologists
Would be the same  and the same 
as the referent (because they saw 
the same object.)
They will be similar but with 
differences because the biologists 
have focused on certain points or 
draw differently.
Different because of diverse points 
of view, different knowledge and/
or understanding of the subject. 
They would be similar because 
the biologists have the same 
knowledge.
Question 5
Which is the best?
Exact similarity with the referent or 
original (book, 
expert...)
More or less the same, the one that 
is more complete has more details...
Knowledge of the phenomenon. 
They include correct aspects 
which were not there initially.
The Agreement Task, the Observe this Im-
age, and the Image Questionnaire were presented 
together with a cell photomicrograph (n.d.).  The 
image represents a eukaryotic colour-dyed cell in 
which the plasma membrane, nucleus and nucle-
olus are differentiated; the cytoplasm organs are 
not at all differentiated (size 5.5x8cm) (see Ap-
pendix B). The reason for including an image in 
all tasks and questionnaire was the need to ensure 
that all participants were thinking about the same 
image in their answers. This type of image was se-
lected because of its representativeness in the bio-
logical domain and also because we expect to find 
more realistic conceptions in this kind of visual-
spatial representation due to their iconic nature 
(Pozzer-Ardenghi & Roth, 2003), compared to 
structure or process diagrams (Lowe, 1993, 2007).
Procedure
First, we applied the task Observe this 
Image followed by the Agreement Task and 
finally the two questionnaires (Image Ques-
tionnaire and Natural Sciences Question-
naire). To counterbalance the order effects of 
the last two questionnaires, we first adminis-
tered the Image Questionnaire and secondly 273
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the Natural Sciences Questionnaire to one half 
of each group and then in reverse order to the 
other half of the participants. Tasks were ad-
ministered at the same time to the entire group 
in their usual rooms. The time available to per-
form the tasks was unlimited. The two groups 
of secondary students (1ºCSE and 3ºCSE) took a 
mean time of one hour to complete all the tasks 
and in the two A level groups (1ºA-SS and 1ºA-
NS), the mean time was forty minutes.
Results
In Table 2, we can find a summary of the 
statistical test carried out, the instruments used, 
and the objective of each analysis. 
We report the results organised according 
to the three questions of the study (see introduc-
tion section). 
1. What conceptions do students have 
about the representational nature of an image? 
Are they the same as the conceptions about sci-
entific knowledge?
The analysis of variance (ANOVA 4x2x3) 
revealed a statistically significant effect for the 
variables Group F(3, 5.791)=5.749, p=.001, Ques-
tionnaire F(1, 58.6)=115,812, p<.001,  and Scale 
F(2, 78.254)=106.849, p<.001, and the interac-
tions Questionnaire by Scale F(2, 14.319)=28.49, 
Table 2 
Summary of the Statistical Analyses
Instrument Objective of analysis Statistical analysis
Image Questionnaire
Natural Sciences Questionnaire
To compare the performance of the 
four groups on the three scales of the 
two questionnaires.
(anova 4x2x3) 
(two anova 4x3)
(three anova 4x2)
Tukey test with Bonferroni 
correction
Agreement Task The distribution of conceptions across 
the four groups both in selection and 
justification parts of the task.
Chi-square test with adjusted 
standard residual 
The relationship between conception 
chosen in the selection and in the 
justification parts of the task.
Chi-squared test with adjusted 
standard residual
Observe this Image Task The distribution of conceptions in the 
five questions throughout the four 
groups.
Chi-square test with adjusted 
standard residual
p<.001, and the three-fold interaction of the 
three variables Questionnaire by Scale by Group 
F(6, 1.137)=2.26, p=.037. Given the result of the 
threefold interaction, we proceeded to first break 
down the interaction of the variables Group and 
Scale, that is, we calculated the interaction sepa-
rately for the two types of Questionnaire (with 
two ANOVAS 4x3) and secondly the interaction 
of the variables Group and Questionnaire, that 
is, we calculated the interaction separately for the 
three kinds of scale (with three ANOVAS 4x2). 
Therefore, the results of the questionnaires come 
from these lasts analyses. 
In connection with the above question, 
we present statistically significant results of 
the questionnaire analysis followed by analysis 
scales.
In the Image Questionnaire, the behaviour 
of the four groups in the three questionnaire 
scales (ANOVA 4x3) reveals an effect of the vari-
able Scale F(2, 36.605)=80.896, p<.001. Accord-
ing to Figure 1, there is a higher score in the 
Realistic scale. Comparing the three scales by 
means of multiple comparisons, we see that the 
score on the Realistic scale is significantly higher 
than that of the other two scales, and that the 
score on the Constructivist scale significantly 
exceeds the Innate-Learned scale (p<.05).274
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Figure 1. Mean scores (degree of agreement) of the 
different groups on the three Image Questionnaire 
scales. 
Figure 2. Mean scores (degree of agreement) of the 
different groups on the three scales of the Natural 
Science Questionnaire.
scale, significantly higher than the other two 
scales, while the Realistic scale significantly ex-
ceeds the Innate-Learned scale (p<.05).
In the Constructivist scale, the behaviour 
of the four groups on the two questionnaires 
(ANOVA 4x2) reveals an effect of the variable 
Questionnaire F(1, 70.246)=157.674, p<.001. Par-
ticipants attained a higher score on the Natural 
Sciences Questionnaire (p<.05). 
2. Do these conceptions about the nature 
of an image vary according to age/education 
level on one hand and to different levels of 
specific biological instruction, on the other? 
Although we presented the statistical analysis 
taking into account the variable group with 
four levels, we considered the influence of 
age/education comparing the results of 1°CSE, 
3°CSE, and either 1°A-NS or 1°A-SS groups. On 
the other hand, we considered the influence of 
different levels of specific biological instruc-
tion, comparing the performance between 1°A-
NS and 1°A-SS groups.
In the Realistic scale, the behaviour of the 
four groups in the two questionnaires (ANOVA 
4x2) also revealed an effect of the variable Group 
F(3, 2.598)=3.772, p=.012. The behaviour on this 
scale is quite similar among the four groups. 
The Tukey test only revealed that on this scale 
the 1ºCSE group significantly exceeds the 3ºCSE 
group (p<.05).
In the Agreement Task, the analyses of 
the selections revealed differences between 
the groups (χ2 (6, N=171)=18, 342, p=.005), and 
we were able to conclude that the group vari-
able and type of conception are related. As 
Table 3 shows, the choice of a realistic con-
ception was significantly more frequent in 
the 1ºCSE group and the least frequent in the 
3ºCSE group. The interpretative realistic con-
ception was selected significantly more by the 
3ºCSE group, while the constructivist concep-
tion was selected significantly more frequently 
by the 1ºA-NS group. 
1°CSE
Realistic Scl Innate-Learnt Scl. Constructivist Scl.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
3°CSE 1°A-SS 1°A-NS
1°CSE
Realistic Scl Innate-Learnt Scl. Constructivist Scl.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
3°CSE 1°A-SS 1°A-NS
In the case of the Natural Sciences Ques-
tionnaire, the behaviour of the four groups on 
the three questionnaire scales (ANOVA 4x3) 
also reveals an effect of the variable Scale F(2, 
56.427)=72.324, p<.001. As shown in Figure 2, 
we obtained a higher score on the Constructivist 275
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In the Agreement Task, the analyses of the 
justifications revealed differences among the 
groups (χ2(9, N=171)=27, 224, p=.001) so we were 
able to conclude that the group variable and type 
of justification are related. As can be seen in Ta-
ble 4, the categories no justification and realistic 
justification were the justifications of the initial 
selection shown by the 1ºCSE group in signifi-
cantly greater proportions. This group also re-
vealed fewer interpretative realistic justifications. 
Conversely, the 3ºCSE group showed a much 
higher proportion of interpretative realistic justi-
fication, while the 1ºA-SS and 1ºA-NS groups did 
not show any significant trend regarding their 
type of justifications.
Table 3 
Distributions (as Percentages) of the Type of Conceptions in the Selections Conditioned to the Group in 
the Agreement Task
Group Realism Interpretative realism Constructivism Total
1ºCSE % 33.3* 31.4 35.3 100%
3ºCSE % 6.1** 53.1* 40.8 100%
1ºA-SS % 18.8 37.5 43.8 100%
1ºA-NS % 15.4 25.6 59* 100%
Total % expected 18.7 37.4 43.9 100%
Note: * Significant adjusted residuals (values>2) are highlighted in dark grey.
** Significant adjusted residuals (values<2) are highlighted in light grey.
Table 4 
Distributions (as Percentages) of the Conceptions Used in the Justifications Conditioned to the Group in 
the Agreement Task
Group
Don’t know/ 
don’t answer
Realism Interpretative realism Constructivism Total
1ºCSE % 49* 25.5* 9.8** 15.7 100%
3ºCSE % 26.5 14.3 46.9* 12.2 100%
1ºA-SS % 18.8 15.6 37.5 28.1 100%
1ºA-NS % 28.2 7.7 38.5 25.6 100%
Total % expected 32.2 16.4 32.2 19.3 100%
* Significant adjusted residuals (values>2) are highlighted in dark grey.
** Significant adjusted residuals (values<2) are highlighted in light grey.
With respect to the relationship between 
selection and justification, there were differ-
ences among the choices (χ2(6, N=171)=80,786, 
p<.001) for the type of subsequent justification 
of the characteristics of the cell’s image. In other 
words, we concluded that the variable type of se-
lection and type of justification are related. The 
type of justification given for the three kinds 
of initial selection of the characteristics of the 
cell’s image for all participants showed the fol-
lowing trend: realistic selections show a realistic 
justification; interpretative realistic selections 
show an interpretative realistic justification; and 
constructivist selections show a constructivist 
justification. 276
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However, we should point out that when 
we analyze data by groups, we can obtain fur-
ther information on the relationship between 
selection and justification. We consider that 
a student is “consistent” when he/she has the 
same conception in the selection and justifica-
tion tasks, and “non-consistent” when he/she 
switches the conception in the justification. As 
we can see, with the exception of the 1ºA-SS 
group, there was a low percentage of consistent 
students (see Table 5). Although some partici-
pants did not show arguments in accordance 
with the conception of their initial selection in 
their justification, these justifications are sys-
tematically of a lower level than the concep-
tion considered in the selection. For example, 
students who chose a constructivist conception 
may have provided an interpretative or realistic 
justification, or those who chose an interpreta-
tive conception gave a realistic justification. 
One case worth highlighting is the direction 
of justifications from non-consistent participants 
who started out from a constructivist selection. 
The explanation for non-consistent participants 
from 1ºCSE was the fact that half this group (52%) 
did not know or did not justify their choice. In 
the case of non-consistent students from 3ºCSE, 
although a high percentage did not know or did 
not justify their choice (35%) the majority justi-
fied it in an interpretative realistic manner (45%). 
The most surprising case was that of non-consis-
tent students from 1ºA-NS because, despite being 
the group which obtained a higher proportion of 
constructivist choices compared to others, half 
the group justified their choice in an interpreta-
tive realistic manner (52.17%). 
In the Observe this Image task, there were 
differences among the groups exclusively in 
Question 3 (“Other versions?”) and Question 5 
(“Which is the best?”). Thus, the variable group 
and type of conception in these two questions 
are related. In Question 3, there were differences 
among groups (χ2(18, N=166)=29, 202, p=.046) 
regarding the conceptions of the possible ex-
istence of other versions of the cell’s image. In 
the 1ºCSE group, we observed a higher number 
of cases in the realistic conception, while in the 
3ºCSE group we observed that this realistic con-
ception is significantly less frequent. The 1ºA-SS 
and 1ºA-NS groups did not reveal any signifi-
cant trend regarding their type of conceptions. 
In Question 5, there were differences among the 
groups (χ2(15, N=166)=29, 117, p=.016) regard-
ing the conceptions of the way in which they 
know which of the two biologists has best shown 
the cell. We observed a statistically significant 
higher number of cases in the category does not 
know/does not answer in the 1ºCSE group, that is, 
this group had more difficulties knowing which 
of the two biologists had best portrayed the cell. 
The 1ºA-SS group showed a realistic conception, 
while the 1ºA-NS group featured a constructivist 
conception and a mixed realistic and construc-
tivist conception. 
Table 5  
Percentage of Students who are Consistent, Not Consistent, or Don´t Know/Don´t Answer with Respect 
to their Justification of the Conception Shown in the Selection Task
Group Consistent No consistent Don’t know/don’t answer 
1º CSE 41.1% 9.8 % 49%
3º CSE 40% 32.65 % 26.53%
1ºA-SS 65% 15.60 % 18.75%
1ºA-NS 33.33 % 38.48% 28.20%277
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3. What kind of conceptions do students 
have regarding learning and teaching about im-
ages, compared to scientific knowledge?
In the Innate-Learned scale, the behaviour 
of the four groups on the two questionnaires 
(ANOVA 4x2), showed an effect of the variable 
Group F(3, 3.515)=3.438,  p=.018. The Tukey test 
showed that the 1ºCSE group had more innate 
conceptions than the 3ºCSE group (p<.05).
The analysis also revealed an effect of the 
variable Questionnaire F(1, 16.282)=23.983,   
(p<.001). The Natural Sciences Questionnaire 
led to a much higher score (more innate) than 
the Image Questionnaire (p<.05). Finally, this 
analysis also revealed an effect of the interac-
tion of the variables Group by Questionnaire 
F(3, 1.890)=2.784, p=.043. There were signifi-
cant differences among the groups only in the 
Image Questionnaire. Specifically on this scale, 
the 1ºCSE group significantly exceeded and, con-
sequently, had more innate conceptions (scores 
near 6 point) than the 3ºCSE and 1ºA-NS groups.
Discussion
This study was an initial attempt to examine 
the representational nature that students attrib-
uted to biological images, considering the lack 
of studies on this subject. Firstly, we expected 
students to attribute a realistic nature to images 
such as a cell photomicrograph, compared to the 
conceptions attributed to scientific knowledge of 
natural science. This initial idea was confirmed 
by the following results: (a) In the Image Ques-
tionnaire, participants attributed a higher score 
to the realistic scale and in the Natural Sciences 
Questionnaire they attributed a higher score to 
the constructivist scale; (b) in the Constructiv-
ist scale, participants obtained a higher score on 
the Natural Sciences Questionnaire than on the 
Image Questionnaire. However, in the Realistic 
scale we did not find scores on the Image Ques-
tionnaire to be higher than on the Natural Sci-
ences Questionnaire, which would support our 
initial idea. 
Other data which would also support the 
above idea of realism for images are some ques-
tions from the Observe this Image task in which 
we found no intergroup differences. Both in the 
question on obtaining the image (Question 2) 
and the question regarding what the images of 
the two biologists who are looking at the same 
object would be like (Question 4), the realistic 
conception was the one more frequently used 
by all the groups. However, we wish to mention 
some aspects of Question 1 (“What is this?”) in 
which the immense majority of students also 
answered according to the realistic conception: 
they mentioned the referent (a cell) instead of 
mentioning the representation (e.g., the pho-
tograph of a cell). However, there are studies 
which consider other possible explanations. 
Studies with children on the early differentia-
tion between different notations (drawings and 
words) (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) consider that 
children use the indefinite article to state what 
appears in a drawing (e.g., given a drawing of a 
horse they would say “a horse”); however, when 
they have to say what is in the word horse they 
would directly say “horse”, without the indefinite 
article. According to Martí (2003) “In all draw-
ings, the designation they make of the notation 
refers to the referent” (p. 74). Therefore, we are 
not certain that the answers found can be inter-
preted as the possession of a realistic conception 
or as a tendency to name the referent of visual-
spatial representations.
Secondly, we stated the idea that there is an 
age/educational level-related progression from 
the realistic to the constructivist, via the inter-
pretative realistic conceptions, on the one hand, 
and that students with specific instruction in 
biology were likely to show more constructivist 
conceptions than the group without that spe-
cific instruction, on the other. We found that the 
youngest group (1ºCSE) had a realistic conception. 
The next age group, students from 3ºCSE, revealed 
interpretative realistic conceptions. Though this 
is a more complex conception, we should not 278
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overlook that this conception still assumes an 
epistemological realism. So, we could consider 
it an intermediate conception between realism 
as one extreme of the dimension and construc-
tivism as the other extreme. Regarding the idea 
that groups with more instruction in biology 
(1ºA-NS) have a constructivist conception, this 
is not fully backed by the tasks employed in this 
study. We found more constructivist concep-
tions in the selection part than in the justifica-
tion part in the Agreement Task.  However, this 
difference can be explained by the nature of the 
two task requirements. A recognition task in the 
selection may facilitate the choice of the most 
complex conception, while the justification task 
demands more requirements in order to find ar-
guments which support the chosen conception. 
In consequence, one can expect to find fewer 
constructivist conceptions in the justification 
than in the selection task. This could indicate the 
difficulty of acquiring a constructivist concep-
tion in the processing of visual-spatial images 
even after having received specific instruction, 
as other studies have shown (e.g., Mason, 2002; 
Pérez-Echeverría et al., 2001). 
The third question was about whether the 
students believe that certain innate capacities are 
necessary to interpret images and whether these 
images do not need to be taught, compared with 
the same conceptions about scientific knowl-
edge. The data showed differences among the 
1ºCSE and 3ºCSE and 1ºA-NS groups; the first 
group showed more innate scores in the Image 
Questionnaire than the second and third groups 
do. However, in general terms, comparing both 
questionnaires on the Innate-Learned scale al-
though the 1ºCSE group revealed more innate 
conceptions than the 3ºCSE group, we also found 
that, overall, there was a higher score at the innate 
extreme of the Natural Sciences Questionnaire 
than in the Image Questionnaire, which does not 
confirm the proposed idea. Perhaps we have to 
analyze to what extent the formulation of items, 
their number and the way to measure them in 
this study is a correct instrument to assess these 
conceptions which often remain implicit.  
Why do participants in this study show a 
realistic conception of the nature of a visual-spa-
tial representation such as a photomicrograph? 
From our perspective, people assume realism 
between the image and its referent because of 
the embodied nature (Pozo & Gómez, 2005) of 
their implicit representations and the supremacy 
of perceptive aspects of the cognitive system. The 
presence of these restrictions makes it difficult to 
learn science due to the necessity of understand-
ing images as representational systems. In the 
words of Martí and Pozo (2000): 
The use of any external representation presuppo-
ses that the subject realises that the meaning of 
this particular object does not arise from the ob-
ject in itself but rather its representative potential. 
It is necessary for the subject to realise that the 
external representation is instead of something 
else and that it is a model of this reality (p. 28).
In other words, this would imply making 
use of the representative function of images as 
external systems of representation. Teaching 
how to read an image needs to explicitly encour-
age understanding the constructive nature of 
images as instruments of representation, learn-
ing and generation of new knowledge. This is 
only possible by means of a graphicacy or visual-
spatial literacy, that is, teachers should specifi-
cally work with their students on interpretation 
and use of visual-spatial representations, help-
ing them to decode graphical messages autono-
mously instead of being simply carried away by 
the impact, apparent simplicity, and immediacy 
of the image.
In conclusion, this study provides an ini-
tial attempt to empirically test the conceptions 
in the domain of scientific images. The results 
obtained must be considered tentative due to the 
exclusive use of one type of image, so that the ge-
neralization to all biological images could be ris-
ky. The tasks and instruments used to measure 279
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these conceptions need further research. We 
also need to assess to what extent some instru-
ments are more suitable to identify the nature 
of the students’ conceptions than others (e. g., 
Likert scale vs. open-ended task or selection vs. 
justification task). Besides, it would be necessary 
to include more types of visual representations 
such as diagrams, dynamic visualizations, and 
other populations such as teachers.
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Items of the Natural Sciences Questionnaire
items of realistic scale:
Item nº 1- In most cases, scientists can clearly state what is actually happening once the facts and 
details are known.
Item nº 4 - A discovery or proven scientific law is and always will be true.
Item nº 18- Scientists see facts as they are and for this reason they can explain the truth to us.
Item nº 22- If two scientists argue and give different explanations on a fact of nature, at least one 
of them will be mistaken.
items of constructivist scale:
Item nº 3- There is no scientific statement which is true in itself as each scientist has his/her own 
experience, but not all statements made by scientists are equally valid and acceptable.
Item nº 6- The effort of scientists may attain an increasingly more approximate knowledge of 
what occurs in nature, but they will never be sure of their theories.
Item nº 16- When two scientists argue and disagree on a topic, both stances may be valid and 
reasonable; they have to come to an agreement.
items of innate-Learned scale
Item nº 7- There are people who are born with special skills for the sciences.
Item nº 15- Intelligent people are those who best understand scientific matters.
Item nº 17- To a great extent, scientific laws arise in or are discovered within ourselves; we don’t 
need to be taught these laws.
Items of the Image Questionnaire
1.  To understand an image of a cell well, we have to be intelligent. 
2.  The image of a cell reveals a way of understanding what a cell is like, but biologists may never be 
sure that this image is the true one.
3.  Good images of a cell are those which reliably and exactly reflect what a cell is.
4.  If two biologists argue on what is seen in a cell’s image, both stances may be valid and reasonable.
5.  The scientific images of the cell aim to report what a cell is like, but we cannot explain what a cell 
is like on the basis of this image.
6.  Although we see a cell through a microscope, we cannot be sure what the cell is like.
7.  I think the realistic images of the cell are better because they show what the cell is like.
8.  There are no correct or incorrect images of a cell as this depends on several factors, for example, 
the purpose we wish to use it for, whom it is aimed at, etc.
9.  To interpret the image of a cell, we have to have good visual-spatial capability.
10. The presence of the cell is only revealed when we see a photograph.
11.  A certain image of a cell is a way to explain what a cell is and not just a description of what a cell 
is like.
12. By observing the above image, we can clearly know what a cell is like.
13.  Before viewing a cell through the microscope, biologists had already traced images of the cell. 283
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14. If two biologists are arguing about the image of a cell they are looking at and they give explana-
tions on this, one of them will be mistaken.
15.  The image of the cell reveals a representation of the cell to us but never what a cell is really like.
16. If we cannot see the cell or do not have an image of the cell, we cannot know with certainty what 
it is like.
17.  It is sufficient to look at a cell’s image to understand it, and it is not necessary for us to be taught 
to look at it.
Questions of Observe this Image Task
1.  What appears in the image?
2.  How do you think this image has been obtained?
3.  Can the image be presented in a different way?  Why?
4.  Imagine that two biologists who are studying and researching on the cell have to draw a cell they 
are observing through the microscope. What do you think their drawings would be like? Will 
they look the same or different? Why?
5.  How can you know (or what would you do to know) who has drawn the cell in a better way?284
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Figure 1. Cell Image
Note. This image is an adaptation from “Cell photomicrograph”. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://escuela.med.puc.cl.